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Executive Summary 
Overview: The war in Syria is the war which has run out of adjectives describing human 
suffering and along with ISIS and the fragmenting of Syria, dominates the news, 
thoughts and concerns of the world. These recent events in the Middle East continue to 
reinforce the global consensus of just how fragile the security situation in that part of the 
world continues to be. More importantly, it shows us at a transition point where precise 
regional engagement is especially crucial in order to guarantee that the United States’ 
security and policy goals in the region are met. Any number of variables threaten to 
exacerbate the situation more so than it already has been in recent years. Moreover, a 
resurgent cast of international powerbrokers has entered the fray in the region, looking 
to stake their claim into the dynamic environment of the region in order to champion 
their own foreign and security policy goals. In order for the United States to ensure its 
interests in the region are protected, a multi-faceted security engagement initiative is 
warranted. Part of that, which will be the focus of this project, will be to assess our 
current security assistance and security cooperation initiatives in the region. 
Specifically, this paper will look at five nation-states in the region whose support is 
crucial to successfully protecting America’s vital interests in the region. This product 
uses the lens’ of security assistance and security cooperation to assess the current 
state of our relationships with those nation-states, and ultimately will utilize that analysis 
in best determining how to refine those relationships in order to maximize the rate of 
return on the United States’ security investment in the region. 
Hypothesis: Security Assistance and Security Cooperation programs continue to 
provide the United States with a viable mechanism to exercise diplomacy, protect 
security interests, and exert foreign policy initiatives in key areas of interest globally. 
When utilized properly, the rate of return on Security Assistance investment makes such 
endeavors worthy of pursuing due to the potential high-payoff in terms of promoting 
security, stability, and humanitarian initiatives. Given the significant amount of US 
treasure invested in Security Assistance programs since September 11th, 2001, is the 
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United States Government satisfied with the reciprocal Security Cooperation shared 
with partner-nations in the Middle East and North Africa region? Moreover, have such 
initiatives produced tangible results to highlight the United States’ efforts to promote 
security and stability in the region? 
Methodology: In this project, we will take a qualitative and quantitative look at the 
Security Assistance and Security Cooperation initiatives that the United States shares 
with the partner nations of Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman. We will 
examine those nations own security concerns in the Middle East and North Africa 
region, juxtapose them to the United States’ security concerns, and analyze the efficacy 
of our Security Assistance and Security Cooperation initiatives with those nations in 
addressing our respective security concerns.  
Conclusions: The results of our research indicate an overall positive response from 
those partner-nations that benefit from maintaining a Security Assistance relationship 
with the United States, with varying degrees of effectiveness. As expected, each nation 
represents a different set of variables that affect the levels of participation that they are 
able to exert in reciprocal Security Cooperation initiatives with the United States. And in 
some cases, other influencing factors come into play, such as human rights concerns. 
In order for the United States to get the maximum benefit from Security Cooperation in 
the region, those individual national nuances must be considered in order to ensure that 
the appropriate levers of influence are wielded. Some nations are better poised to 
reciprocate Security Cooperation initiatives through soft-power mechanisms, while other 
nations are better suited for more tangible initiatives closer to hard power. But in all 
cases, a measurable positive gain for the United States took place. 
  
Security Cooperation 
Since 9/11, the global security environment experienced a significantly changing 
dynamic requiring constant adjustment of security policies and practices on behalf of the 
United States and her allies. As such, the Unites States’ security cooperation initiatives 
have had to match pace with those adjustments. From an American perspective, 
Security Cooperation (SC) includes a variety of interactions overseen by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DOS) to encourage and 
enable international partners to work with the United States in order to achieve our 
strategic objectives. In general, Security Cooperation includes all DoD interactions with 
foreign defense and security establishments, including all Security Assistance (SA) or 
Security Sector Assistance (SSA) programs administered by DoD with DOS oversight. 
Some strategic objectives for security cooperation include: fostering mutually beneficial 
defense and security relationships with partner nations; promoting specific U.S. security 
interests abroad; encouraging international armaments cooperation activities; 
developing allied and friendly nation’s military capabilities for self-defense and 
interoperability during multinational operations, providing U.S. forces with peacetime 
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and contingency access to host nations facilities and infrastructure; and mitigating 
overall risk to U.S. security.1 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress gave DoD and DOS 
increasing authority and funding to conduct a wide array of Security Assistance 
programs under United States Codes Title 10. In order to achieve its foreign policy and 
support defense objectives, the United States conducts Security Cooperation activities 
with 148 different partner nations, adding counterterrorism to an already long list of 
security initiatives. 
After more than a decade of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa, 
escalating defense spending has come under increased scrutiny to ensure the United 
States is gaining the best possible benefit out of its Security Cooperation relationships. 
In short, is the United States getting the most of its taxpayer dollar? In order to evaluate 
the effectiveness of these relationships, there must be constant analysis of Security 
Assistance provided and the reciprocal Security Cooperation received in return. In 
addition, as the security needs of the United States and its partner nations evolve, so 
must the nature of their SA/SC relationship as well to keep pace with this changing 
evolution. 
  
Security Assistance 
Security Assistance is one facet of the greater concept of Security Cooperation, 
and refers specifically to military equipment and training that is granted, sold, or leased 
to partner nations in order to enhance their capabilities to support key security interest 
of U.S. foreign policy. Security Assistance programs are operated under the guidance of 
the Department of State, with much of the execution of the programs being managed by 
the DoD. Most of the Security Assistance programs discussed in this product fall under 
United States Code Title 22, and include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, 
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), and International Military Education and 
Training (IMET). The remaining security assistance program falls under United States 
Code Title 10 Section 1206, providing the Secretary of Defense with the authority to 
equip and train foreign military forces for counterterrorism or stability purposes.2 
Ideally, Security Assistance serves to the advantage of all nations involved. Most 
individual Security Assistance programs have stated goals that are explicitly codified in 
official U.S. Government policy and strategy documents; while some may represent 
more indirect measures that support stated goals from the periphery. Some examples of 
                                                          
1 Neptune. (February 2016). U.S. Security Cooperation Review. Retrieved November 20, 2016, 
from http://www.neptuneasc.com; Ross, Tommy. (2016). Leveraging Security Cooperation as 
Military Strategy. Retrieved November 20, 2016, from https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu. 
2 Rand, D and Tankel, S. (2015). Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return    
on Investment. Center for a New American Security. 
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goals for U.S. security assistance programs include promoting regional stability in areas 
critical to U.S. interests, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
their respective delivery systems, promoting U.S. ideals for good governance and 
human rights, and enhancing the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet 
defense requirements while maintaining long-term military technological superiority at 
lower costs. Here, short term gains should not be given priority over the successes 
achieved from long term investments.3 
Security Assistance in the Middle East 
Bahrain  
Situation  
 The tiny Kingdom of Bahrain has been of strategic importance to the United 
States in varying forms since 1948, when a small US Navy depot opened on the island. 
Over the next decades, that evolved into a much larger presence, with Bahrain 
eventually becoming the host for the headquarters of the United States Navy’s Fifth 
Fleet. The United Kingdom also had a military presence in Bahrain, but that ended in 
1971, which is also the year that the United States established a diplomatic presence in 
the tiny Kingdom. The strategic interests that this island nation presents to the United 
States are quite significant. Geographically, it contains some ideal port facilities for the 
U.S. Navy to use as a strategic base for pursuing security interests throughout the 
region. Geo-politically, Bahrain is a worthy partner nation for the United States for a 
number of reasons. Due to its stature as a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), Bahrain remains a very important ally for U.S. security interests in the Arabian 
Peninsula and Persian Gulf. Second, Bahrain is a sectarian flash point between the 
Sunni-dominated and fellow-GCC members as Saudi Arabia, and Shia-dominated Iran, 
which exerts her influence in the region from across the waters of the gulf. Bahrain is 
ruled by a Sunni monarchy that is allied with its fellow Sunni monarchies in the GCC, 
but the majority of the population is Shia, raining great concern among its GCC partners 
and U.S. allies for the potential of Iranian influence and intrigue.4 
Security Assistance  
                                                          
3 Bartles, C. Understanding Security Cooperation: A Comparison of the U.S. and Russian 
Systems of Security Cooperation; Williams, III J. (Undated) “Achieving Strategic Effects 
in Security Sector Assistance: Untangling Complexities, Delineating Objectives, and 
Modernizing Processes,” 2.  
 
4 Naval Support Activity Bahrain: History. (n.d.). Retrieved December 16, 2016, from 
http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnreurafswa/installations/nsa_bahrain/about/history.html; U.S. 
Relations With Bahrain. (2015). Retrieved December 16, 2016, from 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26414.htm; The World Factbook: BAHRAIN. (n.d.). Retrieved 
December 16, 2016, from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html 
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The U.S. provides security assistance to Bahrain through military training. Small 
amounts of International Military Education and Training funds (IMET) are provided to 
Bahrain. Along with improving Bahrain’s defenses and their interoperability with US 
forces, other US goals are to inculcate principles of civilian control of the military and 
democracy. Bahrain was also part of the U.S. led allied coalition that ousted Iraq from 
Kuwait in 1991. It allowed the stationing of 17,500 U.S. troops and 250 U.S. combat 
aircraft at Shaikh Isa Air Base that participated in the 1991 “Desert Storm” offensive 
against Iraqi forces. In March 2002, President George W. Bush designated Bahrain a 
“major non-NATO-ally”.  That designation qualifies Bahrain to purchase certain U.S. 
arms, receive excess defense articles (EDA), and engage in defense research 
cooperation with the U.S. for which that it would not otherwise qualify.5 
In recent years, the United States has continued to sell military arms to Bahrain. 
Most U.S. military assistance to Bahrain is Foreign Military Financing (FMF). In 2007, 
the United States sold Bahrain several hundred “Javelin” anti-armor missiles, 9 UH-60M 
Blackhawk helicopters, and 6 Bell search and recovery helicopters. In September 2011, 
the United States announced a sale to the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) and Bahrain 
National Guard of 44 Humvee armored vehicles, and several hundred TOW missiles, 
including 50 “bunker busters.”  In 2012, the United States announced the release of 
additional U.S. arms to the BDF, Ministry of Interior (MOI), and Bahrain’s National 
Guard. Accordingly about 85% of Bahrain’s defense equipment is of U.S.-origin. The 
United States also provides training to Bahrain’s military and Ministry of Interior (MI).6 
Security Cooperation 
According to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Bahrain supports the United 
States operationally and logistically through its hosting of their Naval Forces Central 
Command.  This enables the United States to lead a 30 nation military coalition that 
counters piracy and terrorism, and helps maintain the free flow of commerce and energy 
resources through the Strait of Hormuz. Bahrain supports U.S.-led military coalitions, 
including the current international effort against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) (2016).7 
Arab Spring and Beyond 
Since 2011, the United States’ relationship with Bahrain has been strained at 
times. Ever since the violent uprisings, and subsequent government crackdowns in 
Bahrain, the United States has had to exert its weight to ensure that the Bahrain 
government respects the human rights of all Bahrainis. At times, the United States used 
its SA/SC program as a tool to get the government to comply with international 
                                                          
5 Katzman, K. (2016). Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy. Congressional Research 
Service. 
 
6 ibid  
7 ibid 
7 
 
demands for basic human rights.8 However, the United States still maintains its key 
strategic foothold on the island nation, as it supports ongoing security operations 
throughout the region. But, the United States had to take Bahrain into counsel and keep 
exerting pressure since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. 8 
Some of most serious human rights problems revolve around the citizens’ limited 
ability to change their government peacefully and the lack of due process in the legal 
system. Surprisingly, their legal system allows arrests without warrants or charges. 
Lengthy pretrial detentions follow especially in cases against opposition members and 
political or human rights activists. Restrictions on free expression of speech and 
assembly are also being imposed on Bahraini citizens.9 
          Maintaining stability in Bahrain is of utmost importance to the United States for 
many reasons. First, with the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquartered there, scores of US 
citizens in the form of US Navy dependents live on the island, so their safety is of 
utmost importance. Second, and most importantly, Bahrain’s location and port facilities 
infrastructure make it an ideal location for strategic basing, and finding a suitable 
alternative would not at all be easy. Therefore, great effort is taken to encourage the 
Bahraini government to adhere to all basic human rights responsibilities for all of its 
citizens. 10 
 
Lebanon             
Situation 
Lebanon receives more than $165 million each year from the U.S. to pay for 
military training and to purchase military equipment for law enforcement and 
counterterrorism. U.S. interests in Lebanon evolve from a large Lebanese population in 
the America. Historically at one time Beirut was the “Paris” of the Middle East hosting 
U.S. Petroleum attaches before the Lebanese Civil War commencing in 1975.  Lebanon 
also serves as a buffer between war-torn Syria and our long-standing alley Israel.  
Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the UN demand of withdrawal of Syrian 
forces in 2004 generated a post-civil war U.S., which also stemmed from a US desire to 
mitigate Iranian interests there involving Hezbollah which repeatedly attacked Israel. 11  
Security Assistance   
                                                          
8 op. cit. 
9 Ulrichsen, K, (2015). Bahrain’s Uncertain Future. Foreign Policy. 
10 ibid; Terrill, A. (2011, August 2). The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and 
Cooperative Security in the Arab World. Retrieved from Strategic Studies Institute: 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-
Future-of-US-Interests/2011/8/2 
11 Blanchard, C. M. (2014). Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy. Congressional Research 
Service.; Pardos, A. (2007). CRS Report for Congress: Lebanon. Congressional Research 
Service. 
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In August 2006, President Bush provided $230 million in security assistance to 
Lebanon.  In FY 2007, the Bush administration requested $770 million in supplemental 
aid from Congress for Lebanon. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has been used to 
provide tires for tactical vehicles, spare parts for helicopters, small arms, ammunition, 
and improvements to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) communications system. This 
also included spare parts and new equipment, including 25 ton trucks and 285 
Humvees. In FY2009, FMF funds were used to deliver 12 unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV) and 10 M60 tanks. Again in FY2010, funds provided through FMF included $10 
million for sustainment and repair of current equipment, $14 million for acquisition of air, 
ground, and naval systems, $36 million for personnel, equipment, weapons, and 
ammunition, and $40 million for close air support.  In August 2010, the International 
Narcotics and Law (INL) Enforcement Affairs provided their Internal Security Forces 
(ISF) with 4,000 sets of basic duty gear, 3,000 sets of riot control gear, 480 police cars, 
60 police SUVs, 35 handheld radios, 20 computers, 20 new and 24 repaired Harley 
Davidson motorcycles, and refurbished 21 Armored Personnel Vehicles.12 
Not surprisingly funds for military training have also been provided to Lebanon 
such as International Military and Education Training (IMET) support.  IMET in Lebanon 
reduces sectarianism in the LAF and reestablished that force as a unifying national 
institution. Accordingly aid given in 2006 to Lebanon included technical training for 
equipment. Improved training for the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) from the 
U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs (INL) helped close some security gaps found.  As of August 2010, INL had 
trained 4,300 ISF police, including 260 ISF trainers and more than 200 supervisors.13 
Lebanon receives more than 165 million dollars each year from the U.S. for 
purposes ranging from military training and equipment to economic bolstering funds and 
specific programs for law enforcement and counterterrorism.  Professionalizing the 
Lebanese Armed Forces is of high interest to the U.S.  However, some argue this may 
aid terrorism suggesting stricter restrictions on fielding, while others see it as the only 
way to fight Hezbollah and other terror organizations.  
Security Cooperation  
Strict guidelines are now in place to ensure funds are used in Lebanon for their 
intended purposes.  Currently, from the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act a 
detailed spending must regularly be submitted. In this plan, provisions are established 
to prevent misappropriation of funds and equipment. The goal is to keep Lebanon from 
becoming a haven for terrorist groups such as Hezbollah indefinitely.14 
                                                          
12 Addis, C. L. (2011). U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon. Congressional Research Service. 
13 op. cit; Hokayem, E. (n.d.). Iran and Lebanon. Retrieved from United States Institue of Peace: 
The Iran Primer: http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-lebanon 
14 op. cit 
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Economic Support Funds continue to be a large portion of U.S. aid. It is known 
that ESF is used to maintain economic stability, create jobs, establish and maintain 
governments and legal systems, and other budget needs. 
The Iran-Lebanon Connection  
Iranian ties with Lebanon go back centuries. Iran and Lebanon have both been 
dominated by Shiite Muslims.  Thus many senior Shiite clerics in Lebanon were born in 
Iran and trained under Iranian clerics. Shiite Muslims are the largest in Lebanon.  
The modern Iran-Lebanon connection though runs directly through Hezbollah.  
Iran’s involvement with Hezbollah in Lebanon began in 1982. Iran sent 1,500 soldiers 
into the region in 1982 and helped create what would become Hezbollah. In 1983 and 
1984, its militant bombed two American embassies and a barracks housing U.S. and 
French peacekeeping troops killing 241 U.S. Marines on October 23, 1983. Hezbollah 
took responsibility for the attack stating the U.S. and the French troops were meddling 
in Lebanon and siding with the then Lebanon's Christian-dominated government.  When 
dealing with Lebanon, most conversations about Lebanon start with Hezbollah, then 
shift to the Shiite community, and finally conclude with analyzing the state. Iran supplies 
weapons and training to Hezbollah in support of its terrorist goals and activities. Iran has 
built a powerful force to deter Israel and to attack targets in Israel in the event of another 
regional conflict. Hezbollah’s arsenal reportedly includes some 40,000, rockets and 
missiles, including the mid-range Zelzal 1 and Zelzal 2 with a range of 95 miles to 130 
miles, and a variant of the Fateh with a range of 155 miles.15 
Iran sees Hezbollah and Lebanon as its means of waging a proxy war with Israel 
and thus the United States.  Although Iran has shown no desire to face open war with 
the United States, it has been the policy of the Iranian government to wage war against 
Israel and the United States indirectly, by supporting terrorist groups such as Hezbollah.  
Accordingly the Iranian Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC) 
has supplied weapons and training to Lebanon. The IRGC is the backbone of the 
Iranian government and supported these terrorist organizations in Lebanon.  By arming 
and training terrorists in Hezbollah, Iran is able to continue to destabilize the region.16 
Hezbollah is now engaged in fighting in war-ravaged Syria. Also, Hezbollah has 
become the main destabilizing force in the Middle East, under the support of Iran.  It 
continues to be supplied by the IRGC, enabling Iran to continue its by-proxy war 
throughout the Middle East. In Syria since 2013, Hezbollah has been deploying 
thousands of fighters to back President Bashar al Assad. Iran and Hezbollah have 
fought alongside with loyal Syrian troops to regained territory, which Syria lost to the 
                                                          
15 Cafiero, G. (2016, February 18). How Oman Is Helping Obama Shut Down Guantanamo Bay. 
U.S. News. Retrieved November 19, 2016, from 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-02-18/how-oman-is-helping-obama-shut 
down-Guantanamo-bay 
16 Purdy, W. (2013). The Secrets of the IRGC. The Counter Terrorist, 30-42. 
10 
 
rebels and ISIS.  The collapse of the Syrian regime could threaten Iran’s influence in the 
Levant and Hezbollah wants to preserve to access to military and financial support from 
Iran, which would be at risk if Assad falls.17 
Al Jazeera reported on 18 May 2016 that the U.S. has been pressuring 
Lebanon’s central bank to apply the U.S. law, the Hezbollah International Financing 
Prevention Act (HIFPA) of December 2015 which threatens sanctions and account 
closures against anyone who finances Hezbollah or the Lebanese Shia group. Ghassan 
Ayyash, a former deputy-governor of the central bank believes that if Lebanon refuses 
to comply with this law, the country could face economic problems considering the 
Lebanese economy’s reliance on the US dollar.18 
 
 
Oman 
Situation  
A State Department Fact Sheet from March of this year cited Oman as a “vital” 
partner on a wide range of issues, from maritime security to counterterrorism. It 
highlighted the important role that Oman plays in enhancing the relationship between 
the U.S. and the Gulf Cooperation Council, of which Oman is a member nation. Among 
other items discussed were arms and equipment that the U.S. is providing Oman, as 
well as the freedom of navigation arrangements, which Oman provides the U.S. 
Additionally, the U.S. enjoys broad basing rights in Oman as well. However, the U.S. 
has a rather unique security cooperation relationship with Oman. Oman agreed to 
accept detainees from the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. And there is no 
shortage of press coverage highlighting Oman’s role as an intermediary in the region, 
often orchestrating behind the scenes negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, which 
otherwise may not have been possible. Beyond historical connections, Oman’s 
relationship with the United States is upheld by three categories of assistance; Foreign 
Military Sales, Security Cooperation, and Regional Engagement.19  
                                                          
17 Connolly, K. (2015, June 26). Lebanon Pivotal to Iran's Reach Across the Middle East.  
Retrieved from BBC News: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33281739 
18 Al Jazeera. (18 May 2016). Lebanon braced for fallout of US law on Hezbollah, Central bank 
Governor says failure to comply with HIFPA would isolate country’s banks from the 
international market. Retrieved from Al Jazeera News:  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016.05/law-targeting-hezbollah-worries-lebanon-
160518215124772.html   
19 Department of State, (2016, March 3rd). U.S. Relations With Oman, Bureau of Near Eastern 
Affairs, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35834.htm; op. cit.; Ignatius, D. (2016, June 7). The 
Omani 'back channel' to Iran and the secrecy surrounding the nuclear deal. Retrieved 
November 19, 2016, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-omani-back-channel-
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The United States’ diplomatic history with Oman goes back to 1833 when they 
entered into their first treaty together, and since close and friendly relationships have 
been maintained. Foremost, the U.S provides Security Assistance to Oman in the form 
of Foreign Military Financing. The Sultanate of Oman "has long seen the United States 
as the key security guarantor" of the Persian Gulf region. No Omani nationals were 
involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks, and Oman cooperates with U.S. 
intelligence investigations and military efforts against both Al Qaeda and, more recently 
ISIS. Furthermore, Oman has actively participated in the International Military Education 
and Training program. Used by the U.S. to promote our standards regarding human 
rights, this program funds classes in the English language and provides funding for 
counter-terrorism in Oman.20 
Security Assistance 
According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Oman has been a 
reliable partner in the United States’ Foreign Military Sales program since September 
11th, 2001. Over the last decade, the U.S. provided Security Assistance to Oman in the 
form of Foreign Military Financing ($78.652 million), International Military Education and 
Training ($16.32 million), and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related 
Programs ($16.453 million). Additionally, Oman has used this Security Assistance to 
purchase numerous important military equipment from the United States including: 
twelve F-16 aircraft, countermeasures for head-of-state aircraft, air-to-air and surface-
to-air missiles, missile defense, patrol boats, and anti-tank weaponry. Additionally, the 
Omani Government continues to request U.S. support for future initiatives as: 
“The Government of Oman requests follow-on support for its existing F-16 
fleet that includes support equipment, communications equipment, personnel 
training, spare and repair parts, publications, Electronic Combat International 
Security Assistance Program (ECISAP), Contractor Engineer Technical Services 
(CETS), Technical Coordination Group (TCG), International Engine Management 
Program (IEMP), Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory (PMEL) 
calibration and technical orders. The estimated value of this possible sale is $260 
million.”21 
Oman’s continued participation in the U.S.’s Security Assistance program is 
beneficial to both nations. The potential sale of these items will help strengthen the 
                                                          
to-iran-and-the-secrecy-surrounding-the-nuclear-deal/2016/06/07/0b9e27d4-2ce1-11e6-b5db-
e9bc84a2c8e4_story.html 
20 op. cit.; Katzman, Kenneth. (2016, April 26). Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy. 
Retrieved from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21534.pdf; Burns, W. J. (2010, 
September 30). Oman 2010: 40 Years Building the Future. Retrieved 
November 19, 2016, from http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/148455.htm 
21 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Oman-Continuation Of Logistics Support Services 
And Equipment. 2016. Retrieved Wed. 29 Sept. 2016 Retrieved from: 
http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/oman_16-24.pdf 
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military-to-military relationship and will ensure opportunities for the two nations to work 
together, not only to train Oman forces, but also to better assist with future Security 
Cooperation initiatives in the region. 
Security Cooperation 
In assessing Oman’s collaboration in Security Cooperation initiatives in the 
region, it should be viewed through the lens of a broader definition of the term. Much 
like its Gulf State partners, Oman does provide some basing rights for U.S. military 
activity, as is the case with the U.S.’s use of Thumrait Air Base active with U.S. 
participation since September 11th, 2001. Oman also regularly participates in military 
training exercises with the United States in order to enhance combined military 
operations. For example, elements from the United States Marine Corps recently 
conducted Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (or NEO) Exercises with the Omanis. 
These types of training exercises are routine for the Department of Defense, and are 
standard-bearers of Security Cooperation initiatives with the respective host nations, 
such as is the case with Oman.22 
Other Oman initiatives that are also regular contributors to Security Cooperation 
with the United States but are not quite as tangible and definitive as basing rights and 
joint military exercises. For example, in Oman’s agreement to take Guantanamo Bay 
detainees from the U.S. that may in part be directly due to their purchase of F-16’s and 
anti-tank missiles. 23 
The Unites States also depends greatly on Oman’s generosity for access to the 
Straits of Hormuz, a key transit point for our U.S. Navy ships to reach the Persian Gulf, 
U.S. ports in Bahrain, UAE, and other stops plus commercial traffic. Since Iran owns the 
other half of the Straits, the U.S. depends heavily on Oman’s cooperation for access 
which directly supports our security initiatives in the region.24 
                                                          
22 Bentham, M. (2001, September 30). American planes fly in to RAF desert base in Oman. 
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N%20Report.pdf; Gladstone, R. (2015, May 01). Strait of Hormuz Once Again at Center of U.S.-
Iran Strife. Retrieved November 19, 2016, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/world/middleeast/strait-of-hormuz-once-again-at-center-of-
us-iran-strife.html 
13 
 
Regional Engagement 
With respect for Regional Engagement, Oman plays a crucial role in this in the 
region. Moreover, there are many examples of critical roles that Oman has contributed 
to successful outcomes of U.S. initiatives in the region. The Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) is a key partner of the United States on the Arabian Peninsula and in the Gulf, 
with Oman being a member state. Many of our security initiatives in the region are with 
all GCC member states, with military basing and arms sales only making up a small part 
of it.25 
As previously mentioned, Oman’s most important role in recent years has been 
of its ability to act as an intermediary between the United States and Iran on critical 
negotiations between the two, establishing a diplomatic side-channel between two 
nations that rarely communicate. Oman’s negotiating prowess in recent years include 
the recent nuclear deal with Iran.26 
Trade with Oman is also rich. Given the Free Trade Agreement that the U.S. and 
Oman entered into in 2009, we may want to consider how trade plays into the 
appreciation/cooperation that Oman gives in return for U.S. Security Assistance. While 
we provide Oman with equipment like machinery, vehicles, aircraft, and medical 
instruments, Oman provides the U.S. with materials as crude oil, jewelry, plastics, and 
iron. Additionally, there remains a potential for cooperation and growth between the 
U.S. and Oman regarding its more traditional trade initiatives related to oil infrastructure 
and oil supply.27 
Conclusion 
            Of all of the partner-nations that the United States maintains diplomatic and 
military relationships with in the Middle East, Oman should be held in high regard as a 
dependable and consistent ally in the region. Oman has proven on many occasions that 
it is a willing participant in the U.S.’s security initiatives in the region. Oman has the 
potential to ‘punch above its weight’ in foreign policy circles at crucial times, and it is 
imperative to the United States continue to cultivate that relationship in ways which are 
mutually beneficial to both nations. 
Domestic and Military Concerns 
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Domestically, Oman struggles to diversify its economy. Oil makes up about 60% 
of Oman’s revenues, and experts predict that existing oil reserves will only last about 
fifteen more years. The nation wants to both diversify its economy and invest in liquid 
natural gas production 
Militarily, much like the U.S., Oman is dealing with terrorism which plagues the 
Arabian Peninsula. The nation also struggles to normalize its relationship with Shiite-
Islamist-dominated Iraq.28 
Jordan 
Situation  
Due to its location, Jordan is a key piece of the United States’ security strategy in 
the Middle East. Although a formal treaty does not connect Jordan and the United 
States, the nations have worked closely together towards security and regional stability 
since the 1950’s. Following the 9/11 attacks, Jordan issued bans on banking operations 
linked to terrorist activities and pursued individuals linked to Al Qaeda.  Jordan has 
historically been a strategic partner in promoting Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, 
mitigating threats from the Islamic State, and serving as a staging ground for operations 
in Syria. U.S. assistance should not neglect to focus on in-country stability, border 
security, and Jordan’s participation in the Syrian refugee crisis. Due to its powerful 
neighbors and strategic location Jordan will continue to be an important asset in the 
region.29   
Jordan lacks the major resources of its regional counterparts, and therefore its 
economy is significantly dependent on foreign aid, tourism, and remittances. The United 
States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951.  
Since FY2015 Jordan has been provided with $15.83 billion in aid.  In February, 2015 
President Obama signed a three-year memorandum of understanding (MOU) pledging 
to provide Jordan with $1 billion annually in U.S. foreign assistance from FY2015 
through FY2017. FY2016 appropriations set forth at least $1.275 billion in economic and 
military aid for Jordan and authorizes the use of broader Department of Defense funding 
to increase border security. Also, Congress has provided up to $600 million from the 
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund in security assistance.30 
U.S. military funding for Jordan has been steady over the last decade, and 
continues to diversify. The Coalition Support Fund, used to reimburse coalition partners 
for participating in U.S. military operations has seen significant disbursements to Jordan 
in FY2015. Jordan has received several Foreign Military Financing grants to maintain a 
small group of F-16 fighters and purchase Advanced Medium Range Missiles. These 
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grants also allow for purchase of U.S. Blackhawk helicopters, Javelin missiles, Hellfire 
missiles, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, and night-vision devices. These 
improvements to Jordan’s military capabilities add to its ability to monitor the border and 
respond to terrorist threats in partnership with the U.S.31 
Security Assistance  
U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations.  
Jordan has had an increased role in the fight against ISIS by conducting airstrikes in 
Syria and Iraq.  For this reason, majority of Jordan’s request has been to continue the 
air campaign against ISIS and to secure their border.   
 March 2015, State Department approves Foreign Military Sale for M31 Unitary 
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) for an estimated cost of $192 
million.  The Jordanian government has requested 72 (GMLRS) Rocket Pods (6 
rockets per pod for a total 432) 32 
 May 2015, State Department approves sale of UH-60M VIP Blackhawk and (2) 
T700-GE-701D engines for a total cost of $21 million.33 
 August 2009, a request is made for 85 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range 
Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) for a total cost of $131 million.34 
 November 2009, a request by Jordan to buy 1808 Javelin Anti-Tank Guided 
Missiles, 18 Fly-to-Buy Missiles, 162 Javelin Command Launch Units (CLUs) 
with an estimated cost of $388 million.35 
 September 2009, a request by Jordan to buy 12 M142 High-Mobility Artillery 
Rocket Systems (HIMARS) Launchers; 72 M31 Unitary Guided Multiple Launch 
Rocket Systems (GMLRS) Rocket Pods; 36 Multiple Launcher Rocket Systems 
(MLRS) Practice Rocket Pods; 12 M1084A1P2 Family of Medium Tactical 
Vehicle Trucks (FMTV); one Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
(AFATDS); three M108A1P2 Wreckers; three M1151A1 High-Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs); 27 AN/VRC-92E Single Channel 
Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS); and 18 AN/VRC-90E 
SINCGARS and related services and support. The estimated cost is $220 
million.36 
 February 2016, State Department approves a Foreign Military Sale to Jordan for 
the repair and return of 52 F100-PW-220E F-16 Engines at a cost of $115.1 
million.37 
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           In 2015, King Abdullah II requested additional munitions, which lead to more 
rapid munitions delivery by the United States, including F-16 air strike munitions, guided 
bomb kits, pilot survival gear, and spare parts. Reports indicate that items requested by 
Jordan for border security include UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, Hellfire missiles, 
Kevlar vests, night-vision devices, and TOW anti-tank missiles. Jordan is also eligible to 
receive excess U.S. defense equipment, and has received around $81.69 million worth 
of articles, equipment, and training since 2009. The U.S. and coalition forces also 
provide directly or provide funding for Patriot missile systems, artillery, fighter aircraft, 
and communications systems to promote the security of Jordan and the region.38 
Security Cooperation  
Currently there are 2,200 U.S. military personnel deployed to Jordan and will 
remain in there, at Jordan’s invitation, until the security situation stabilizes. These 
soldiers support the U.S. F-16s in Jordan and control the Patriot missile battery near 
Jordan’s Syrian border, among other duties. Jordan’s primary role in the Syrian effort is 
to lead the coalition’s vetting initiative, which determines which opposition groups 
should be considered terrorists and be excluded from political transition.  Jordan’s role in 
the coalition’s efforts against the Islamic State have been increasing, including air 
strikes, which escalated after the execution of a Jordanian pilot by the Islamic State in 
2015. Additionally, the U.S. has provided military training for senior leadership and 
counter-terrorism partnership training. This training relationship pre-dates the current 
coalition operations against ISIL. Jordan continues to allow the use of its bases by the 
U.S. and coalition forces, and plays an important role with the U.S. in regional 
intelligence sharing.  A highlight to the integration of U.S. and Jordan Forces is Eager 
Lion.  It is the largest military exercise in U.S. Central Command where thousands of 
service personal from different countries build relationships and partnerships.39    
Given Jordan’s geographic location to the region, and it’s more moderate Islamic 
practice, the country is sensitive toward the spread of extremist ideologies and terrorist 
activities that threaten its security. Jordan has consistently been a willing partner of the 
U.S. in our recent initiatives in combatting terrorism over the last decade to varying 
degrees. This indicates that Jordan is smartly applying the Security Assistance that they 
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have accepted from the U.S. and is a willing participant in our Security Cooperation 
initiatives.40  
In the best interest of exercising precise regional engagement, Jordan provides 
an excellent opportunity to audit our current Security Cooperation initiatives that we 
have with them, especially given the large amount of investment that they have received 
since 9/11. In order to ensure that we are maximizing the application and outcome of 
our Security Assistance and Security Cooperation activities with Jordan, it is imperative 
to maintain a clear understanding of each other’s security needs in the region and 
ensure that both nations work together to bolster Security Cooperation in the most 
effective and efficient way. It is necessary to do that with any nation that we conduct 
such activities. However, given Jordan’s high potential to be a guarantor of success for 
U.S. security initiatives in the region, more precise engagement and expectation 
management with Jordan is warranted and recommended.41 
Regional Engagement 
With respect for Regional Engagement, Jordan plays a crucial role in this in the 
region. Moreover, there are many examples of critical roles that Jordan has contributed 
to successful outcomes of U.S. initiatives in the region. The bans placed by the 
Jordanian government on banking operations after 9/11 show the commitment Jordan 
has with the United States going after terrorist. Jordan’s most important role in the 
region has been their increased role in the air campaign against ISIS, as well as 
housing 600,000 Syrian refugees which have put a strain on Jordan’s limited resources.  
Even the U.S. State Department has emphasized the importance of Jordan’s role as the 
lead Arab partner in the coalition against ISIS has an active participant in the air 
campaign.42    
Conclusions 
Jordan is a vital ally in the region, especially with the ongoing war with ISIS, but not all 
operations with Jordan have been successful. Ineffective operations on the Southern 
Front and Russian intervention have held back some security operations, but have not 
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affected the overall mission. Most recently, in November, 2016 three American military 
trainers who were in Jordan to help upgrade the kingdom’s armed forces were shot at a 
Jordanian air base. The incident is still under investigation. This investigation could play 
a major role in what further assistance the U.S. will lend to Jordan after the last 
agreement has ended.  Though that the United States continue to support Jordan and 
are continuing to support the country it is hard to see the exact cooperation that given to 
the U.S. The U.S.’s objective is very clear in Jordan it is to fight ISIS and any other 
forms of terrorism that wishes to do harm to the homeland.43 
Security Assistance in North Africa 
Morocco 
Morocco and the U.S. share many of the same interest such as: economic 
prosperity of both countries, the pursuit of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, 
the maintenance and promotion of regional security and cooperation, and sustainable 
development. Over the past three decades, U.S.-Moroccan relations was characterized 
by mutual respect and friendship. Morocco and the United States boast a “Friendship & 
Commerce Treaty” which remains today the longest unbroken treaty in American 
history.44 
 Morocco, too, is a strong partner with the U.S. in terms of counter-terrorism in 
the region. Formally recognized in 1786, Morocco and the U.S. signed a treaty of peace 
and friendship. Since then, the two have worked closely on issues such as regional 
security, political and economic transition, and sustainability. As the 55th largest trading 
export market for American goods, Security Cooperation with Morocco is a strong 
priority for the U.S.45 
The two countries share common values, mutual trust, and strong friendship and 
partnership. Recent examples of that partnership include the creation of specially 
trained counterterrorism military units, clamping down on illegal immigration, blocking 
terrorist access to financial resources, promoting ethnic and religious tolerance and 
accelerating economic growth through rehabilitating the agricultural sector. Further, the 
2012 Congressional Budget Justification defines Morocco as a key partner nation in 
supporting the U.S. strategic goal of enhancing U.S. interoperability throughout the 
African continent. This is important because they are maintaining regional interests in 
Africa. Most notably, in the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism of 2014, 
Morocco received positive reviews from the State Department on their counter-terrorism 
strategy and their security cooperation efforts both regionally and internationally. This is 
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quite an accomplishment for Morocco, considering that the United States has invested 
considerably less in Security Assistance and Cooperation with them when compared to 
its regional neighbors.46  
Security Assistance 
There are recent reports on the Security Assistance Monitor website that 
Morocco is actively receiving U.S. military arms sales and assistance. However, a more 
detailed list of specific military equipment provided to the Moroccans since 9/11 is found 
at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s website. That list is not very long. Since 
9/11, the U.S. has provided the Moroccans with 600 TOW Missile and 300 TOW 
launchers, with the appropriate maintenance and training package in November 2015. 
Period. Only recently did we step up with combined military exercises and training. In 
April of 2016, the U.S. and Morocco, along with several of their counterparts gathered 
for the 16th iteration of the African Lion which focused on inter-military cooperation, and 
crisis-action planning. “For the first time, the U.S., Morocco, and Mauritania also 
conducted a joint intelligence training mission in preparation for the exercise”.47  
In fact, compared to its Middle East and North Africa neighbors, Morocco does 
not receive as robust Foreign Military Sales and Financing package from the United 
States. And what aid that it does receive most often has pre-conditions and caveats 
attached to it. The United States has provided funding to Morocco for counter-terrorism 
training as well as border surveillance and communications equipment. But the overall 
total dollar amount that Morocco receives in FMF from the United States is pennies on 
the dollar when compared to its neighbors in the region. Specifically, the U.S. recently 
provided “$15 million in total aid ($12 million in FMF, $3 million in INCLE).” Attached to 
this aid were pre-conditions that the funds “support democratic reforms and economic 
development.” Additional funding requests for Morocco included, “$29.872 million in 
total aid ($20 million in ESF, $5 million in FMF, $3 million in INCLE, $1.872 million in 
IMET).” But this funding was also to include methods to “support a human rights and 
monitoring role for the U.N. Mission in Western Sahara, in cooperation with the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights.”48 
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Foreign Assistance and NGO Support 
There are other areas in which money is being invested in Morocco which have 
had an impact on Security Cooperation initiatives. Through the use of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO’s), the U.S. has provided foreign assistance intent 
on countering violent extremism. There are three such programs significant to Morocco. 
First is USAID’s “Countering Violent Extremism in the Middle East and North Africa 
(CoVEMENA).”49 The second initiative is, “$66.5 million in State Department- and 
USAID-administered funds” to assist Morocco in building capacity “to counter the threat 
posed by terrorist groups in the region.” Finally, a Defense Department effort that 
provides, “$450 million in Defense Department Counter-Terrorism Partnership Fund 
(CTPF) for programs to build the counterterrorism capacity” of Morocco and other 
countries in Africa “to counter AQIM, Al Shabaab, and other terrorist groups (including 
Boko Haram, which has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State).” Beyond military 
assistance and aid, Morocco benefits from “USAID programs that address development 
challenges such as illiteracy, malnutrition, and unemployment. In Morocco, USAID is 
implementing job training and structural adjustment programs to transition its economy 
following the October 2004 signing of the U.S.-Moroccan Free Trade Agreement."50 
Security Cooperation & Regional Engagement 
In the past, the U.S. has expressed concerns regarding Morocco’s human rights 
record, which may have an impact on future security cooperation initiatives. A report 
from the U.S. Government Accountability Office 2006 (GAO-06-850), called “Lapses in 
Human Rights Screening in North African Countries Indicate Need for Further 
Oversight,” and indicates that there might be some issues concerning Security 
Cooperation and the allocation of funding and training for those purposes. However, 
recent reports indicate that in the wake of terrorist threats and a recent decrease in 
funding from 2014, Moroccan leaders are more willing to boost Joint Security 
Cooperation.51 
There are other examples of recent regional engagement on Morocco’s behalf 
that point to Security Cooperation opportunities. Morocco supported the Framework for 
the Elimination of Chemical Weapons in the Executive Council of the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Additionally, Morocco supported the UNSC 
resolution that called on the Syrian regime to fully cooperate in the elimination of its 
chemical weapons program. With regard to its neighbor, Mali, during its reconstruction, 
His Majesty King Mohammed VI recently announced that Morocco will train 500 Malian 
imams in the countries’ shared spiritual values of openness and tolerance.52 
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Security Cooperation and engagement throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa region is especially crucial in the wake of 2011’s Arab Spring. There are barriers 
that prove to be more of a hindrance than a benefit. One such barrier is relations 
between Algeria and Morocco, which in the past decades has been far from warm. This 
especially impacts the Western Sahara region.53 
Domestic and Military Concerns 
Domestically, Morocco struggles with political instability in regard to the balance 
of power between its monarchy and the rest of its political system. The nation also, in 
the opinion of some, falls short of providing basic human rights, including freedom of 
expression and religion and equal rights for women. Militarily, Morocco must deal with 
issues of terrorism that are common in the region. Morocco nationals have been both 
the perpetrators and victims of terrorism attacks, and terrorism has been dubbed the 
"main threat to Morocco's domestic security".54 
Conclusion 
            Given Morocco’s proximity to the counter-terror fright on the African Continent, 
as well as it’s critical cultural and regional ties to the Middle East, Morocco hold 
potential to be a key supporter of U.S. security initiatives in that part of the world. They 
are in a unique position to support U.S. efforts in combating violent extremism as well 
as supporting U.S. policy initiatives in both Africa and the Middle East. Morocco may still 
have some work yet to do on other issues, such as its human rights record, but it still 
remains the most stable of the Northern African nations and provides ample 
opportunities for U.S. regional engagement on security issues. 
General Recommendations 
In the security environment of uncertainty the United States faces, long-term efforts to 
build and maintain a foundational base of security partners through exercises, military 
education, and exchanges are wise investments to hedge against future security 
challenges. Assessment constructs must capture both short- and long-term returns with 
an emphasis on transitional continuity from short to long term. The fact that there is no 
agreed upon framework to validate security cooperation does not mean one cannot be 
created, and it is hoped this and other studies lend evidence to accomplishing this. Here 
we look strategically and operationally, using both qualitative, and quantitative analysis 
to see if what we are doing is actually working. We believe that it is in the five nations 
studied.  We must also ask ourselves if we are accomplishing the mission we identified 
at the beginning. Lastly, time is another factor which needs to be taken into 
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consideration.  A realistic timeline must be put in place in order to achieve the mission 
we want accomplished.  We cannot expect to see a return on our investment in security 
cooperation unless adequate time is given for that to develop and sistain.55   
Conclusions  
Of the five countries of this study, the top three largest recipients of United States 
treasure from 2001 to 2016 in all programs of military and police aid were Jordan 
($720m in 2015), Lebanon ($327m in 2007), and Bahrain ($90m in 2003). Security 
Sector Assistance is used to influence partner nation to achieve US strategic goals. The 
magnificently humble Oman and then the somewhat mysterious Morocco were not far 
behind Bahrain however, with tops in U.S. investments being $81m in 2003 and $66m 
in 2012 respectively. It is easy to see also how the amount of United States investment 
in the region is driven by events on the ground. The US spent a lot of money in foreign 
military and police aid to Oman, Jordan, and Bahrain in 2003, the year we executed 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Those are also countries we still have varying degrees of 
basing rights with to this day, participate in combined military operations and training 
exercises, and contribute somewhat readily to our security interests. After the events of 
Arab Spring of 2011, we started investing less foreign military aid in Bahrain and Oman, 
both having experienced internal unrest at varying times. Those two countries have yet 
to receive pre-Arab Spring levels of US monetary investment in military and police aid. 
Morocco and Jordan have happily received the most recent large investments of 
American capital, as the US focus shifted toward countering terrorism in North Africa 
and ISIS expansion in Iraq and Syria in the years since 2014. Jordan, Bahrain, and 
Oman have been great benefactors of our military equipment, while Morocco and 
Lebanon have been the focus of other types of programs.56  
With regard to sectarian issues in these countries, extensive problems remain, on a 
scale from extremely volatile to relatively neutral and benign. Bahrain is a Sunni 
monarchy with a Shia majority population, and most would argue that oppress this 
majority. The murky situation in Lebanon represents a rather even split between Sunni 
and Shia among its Islamic population dominated by traditional Shia control. Bahrain 
and Lebanon offer the best opportunities for Iranian malign influence out of these five 
countries. Jordan and Morocco are hold mostly Sunni populations, with Jordan being 
the more tolerant of the two regarding Shiites, thereby being the most susceptible to 
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ISIS threats. Lebanon, Jordan, and Iran are major stakeholders with Syria for differing 
reasons, and are concerned about the outcome there as it greatly and directly affects 
them all. Then there is Oman, unique in that it is a mostly Ibadi Islamic population, 
allowing them to avoid much of the sectarian problems which typically plague its 
neighbors in the region. It also allows Oman to act as intermediary between its larger 
belligerents that are on opposite sides of the sectarian issues. We can conclude that 
tailored Security Sector Assistance (SSA) based upon knowing the values, ethnicity and 
religions of the region and especially the nations which we are assisting, can be 
carefully crafted to produce acceptable U.S. security cooperation. This is anchored in 
the belief that most citizens of these nations want security foremost with some sense of 
self-determination as seen through the lens of their religious beliefs, and that the United 
States can bring that incrementally along a timeline. This can be accomplished by 
mitigating threats through strategic, operational and tactical cooperative military and 
diplomatic initiatives which are mutually reinforcing, and stand the test on time for all 
nations involved. 57 
 
   
  
                                                          
57 (2010). International Religious Freedom Report 2010. Washington DC. 
 
24 
 
 
Appendix  
 
  
25 
 
  
26 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
